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How Does Work Feature in Literature on Youth Participation in Violence? 
Caitriona Dowd 
 
Summary 
This paper explores the evidence available on the role of work in youth participation in 
violence, through a study of recent research and evidence in this field. The evidence 
review considers the role of ‘work’ broadly, seeking to go beyond restricted definitions 
of waged and formal sector employment or underemployment. It considers the role of 
formal and informal work, different forms of work, and the various potential roles – both 
positive and negative – that work may play in youth participation in violence. The study 
will also employ a broad definition of ‘violence’ – considering youth participation in 
organised, mass-mobilised conflicts; ‘radicalised’ or ‘extremist’ violent groups; less 
formal, criminal violence; and, where relevant, interpersonal violence. The deliberately 
broad definition of violence facilitates a focused analysis of the evidence and research 
surrounding the role of work in youth engagement in all forms of violence that 
constitute a disengagement from a peaceful social order, recognising the interlinkages 
between multiple and varied outward manifestations of violence (for example, criminal, 
economic, political and interpersonal violence). The study explores the evidence for the 
role of work in youth violence participation at the intersection of multiple forms of work, 
multiple forms of violence, and multiple forms of participation, mapping gaps in existing 
research and evidence, and opportunities for further research and analysis. Attention 
will be concentrated on research and evidence produced after 2010, building on the 
work of Cramer (2010) on unemployment and violence. 
 
Keywords: Youth, violence, conflict, labour, employment, work, evidence. 
 
Caitriona Dowd is a Research Fellow in the Conflict and Violence cluster at IDS, 
specialising in the politics of violent conflict and sub-national governance in sub-Saharan 
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inequality and violence, the geography and diffusion of violence, and the application of 
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1 Introduction 
In 2014, 1.2 billion people live in countries that are considered ‘fragile’ (typically, conflict-
affected), and a further 800 million in countries with high homicide rates (Blattman and 
Ralston 2015: 1). A perception of rising global instability, and increasingly interconnected 
global violence, has given new impetus to donor and research initiatives to understand the 
conditions under which people participate in violence. One area donors, policymakers and 
researchers are increasingly exploring to understand the conditions of this violence, is the 
question of youth involvement. Young people are perceived to be the primary agents of 
violence in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, and particular attention has been dedicated 
to the role of unemployment in driving this participation. Prominent researchers have 
explicitly advised,  
 
In order to avoid instability and violence in particular, the focus [of donors and 
governments] should be on improving economic opportunities for young people, 
particularly by providing employment or educational opportunities for youth in periods 
of economic decline.  
(Urdal 2012: 9) 
 
National governments have been ardent supporters of this particular framing of the youth–
unemployment–conflict nexus: in 2006, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf equated 
‘the level of unemployment and the idleness of our youth’ with potential ‘social 
disenchantment. For us, employment is synonymous to peace’ (Sirleaf 2006: 3). Key 
international actors have also echoed these sentiments. In 2014, former US President 
Barack Obama addressed the UN, in a commitment to ‘expand our programs to support 
entrepreneurship and civil society, education and youth – because, ultimately, these 
investments are the best antidote to violence’ (White House 2014).  
 
At the intergovernmental level, the issue of young people and violence is consistently framed 
in similar terms: according to the UN Office for West Africa, youth unemployment ‘fuels 
conflict and crime’, making ‘job creation… a key tool for conflict prevention’ (UNOWA 2005). 
In 2015, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security, 
reinforcing the importance of a focus on unemployment in the prevention of violence, and in 
the youth disengagement and reintegration from violence: 
 
 (2550, 11) ‘The Security Council […] stresses the importance of creating policies for 
youth that would positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts, including social and 
economic development, supporting projects designed to grow local economies, and 
provide youth employment opportunities and vocational training, fostering their 
education, and promoting youth entrepreneurship and constructive political 
engagement’;  
 (2550, 17, (a)) ‘The Security Council […] encourages […] evidence-based and gender-
sensitive youth employment opportunities, inclusive labour policies, national youth 
employment action plans in partnership with the private sector, developed in 
partnership with youth and recognising the interrelated role of education, employment 
and training in preventing the marginalisation of youth’;  
 (2550, 17, (b)) ‘The Security Council […] encourages […] investment in building young 
persons’ capabilities and skills to meet labour demands through relevant education 
opportunities designed in a manner which promotes a culture of peace’; and 
 (2550, 17, (c)) ‘The Security Council […] encourages […] support for youth-led and 
peacebuilding organisations as partners in youth employment and entrepreneurship 
programs’.  
(UNSC Resolution 2550, 2015)  
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The resolution is explicitly contextualised against a backdrop of ‘a time when an estimated 
600 million young people live in fragile and conflict-affected settings and against the rise of 
radicalisation and violent extremism, especially among young women and men’ (UN 
Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth 2015). The UN Executive Director of the UNFPA states 
that ‘it is imperative for us to invest in young people to fulfil their potential and help achieve 
peace and security’ (UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth 2015). 
 
Characterisations have long proliferated of young, unemployed people as ‘looking for 
trouble’ (The Economist 2011), with particular attention paid to the conditions of un/under-
employment which may have given rise to youth participation in violence in West Africa (see 
Kaplan 1994; Utas 2003). However, these depictions have taken on particular significance in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, which several analysts and policymakers have linked directly to 
the issue of youth unemployment. 
 
Policy funding has followed framing: between 2002 and 2012, the World Bank invested an 
estimated US$9bn in almost 100 skills training programmes for the poor and unemployed 
(Blattman and Ralston 2015: 4). Beyond the World Bank alone, it is estimated that over 200 
employment creation programmes were implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, and 50 in 
Southern Asia in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Holmes et al. 2013: 23). 
Individual donors have been particular champions of this approach: in 2012, USAID 
estimated that it spent at least US$300m on youth programmes. However, that same 
estimate pointed to a shortcoming in this prolific spending: USAID concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence available to allow an evaluation of the impact of these interventions 
(Mercy Corps 2015: 8). 
 
In fact, rigorous exploration of the relationship between youth unemployment and violence 
has been hampered by an underlying dearth of data and evidence. Robust assessments of 
this relationship are limited not only by a paucity of data and statistical capacity in many 
violence- and conflict-affected countries, but equally by inconsistent, competing and 
divergent theorisations and operationalisations of – inter alia – the concepts of youth, work, 
un/under-employment, and violence. Available evidence, summarised in this review, points 
to enormous gaps – both in available data and the capacity to systematically collect it – that 
serve to seriously qualify claims of a simple, linear relationship between youth 
unemployment and violence.  
 
Moreover, what evidence is available from more robust studies, suggests that each of these 
categories need to be theoretically – and operationally – unpacked and further specified in 
order to make evidence-based and informed judgments on the precise nature of this 
relationship. The simple fact is that not all youth without work (or without sufficient work) 
participate in all forms of violence, but a lack of conceptual specificity has hampered 
empirically grounded advances in the field of understanding when, how, who does, and in 
what types of violence, and what opportunities this presents for intervention, conflict 
management and conflict prevention. 
 
What consensus there is on robust relationships, while often limited to individual cases or 
countries and therefore generalised with caution, suggests that work plays a complex role in 
young people’s participation in violence, and rarely – if ever – a mono-causal one. Un/under-
employment intersects with other forms of social and economic exclusion to create 
conditions in which some young people are more likely to engage in organised violence and 
conflict, and only participation lower-intensity and less-organised forms of violence appear to 
respond positively to economic incentives (such as work creation) alone. Moreover, far too 
little remains known about: 
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1. The ways in which different types of young people – too often treated as a single, 
homogeneous whole – navigate these relationships and incentives;  
2. The ways in which different forms of violence respond to different conditions and 
incentives for young people; and 
3. The ways in which work in its multiple forms co-exists alongside participation in 
violence. 
 
The following review summarises divergent and contested theories of young people, work 
and violence, before reviewing available evidence on the interrelationship between the three. 
It concludes with suggestions and opportunities for future research that respond to gaps in 
this field. 
 
 
2 Concepts and definitions  
The concepts of work, youth and violence are diversely defined and highly contested. 
Importantly, they are also interlinked and not always easily separable. As Oosterom et al. 
(2016: 5) note, 
 
the nature of the local economy can be deeply political and political actors shape the 
economy through formal and informal practices, with implications for young people [...] 
In their pursuit of economic opportunities in contexts of violence, young people are 
required to navigate the politics of the local economy, and this includes navigating 
potentially violent political actors. 
 
The need to navigate these fields carefully is all the more sharply delineated in contexts of 
high-intensity or widespread violence. In these conditions, work opportunities not only 
provide a means of securing an income, and potentially other forms of social connections 
and status; but also serve as sites of social practice and identity construction for young 
people (Oosterom et al. 2016: 5). These can be intricately interlinked with economies of 
violence, and the means of securing safety and protection. In (certain) extreme cases, 
terminology associated with fighting forces, such as ‘rebel’ may be conceptualised by 
populations as functionally synonymous with ‘youth’ and ‘marginality’ (see Hoffman 2011: 
38), attesting to the ways in which the concepts of work, young people and violence become 
inextricably interlinked in particular circumstances.  
 
The section below summarises key definitions and conceptualisations of these categories, 
but it is important to bear in mind the ways in which they overlap, the particular conditions 
which may render them interrelated, and the implications this has for the nature of the 
relationship between them. 
 
This review deliberately considers the broader category of ‘work,’ rather than ‘employment’ 
alone, in an attempt to understand not only the role of formal, waged labour in violence, but 
also the role of informal work, under-employment, and unpaid labour, in the calculus to 
participate in violence.  
 
2.1  Work 
A clear distinction between formal and informal work is, in any event, often difficult to 
delineate in the lives of young people in conflict- and violence-affected contexts. In low-
income countries, poor households typically engage in a ‘portfolio of work’ (Blattman and 
Ralston 2015: ii) encompassing ‘mixed livelihoods’ (Maclay and Skelton 2017: 4), rather than 
holding a single ‘job’ in the conventional sense of the term. Poor people tend to engage in a 
diverse range of income-generating activities, either simultaneously or at different points 
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over time, which diversifies risk over multiple income streams. This is particularly true in 
economies with a large informal sector, where work may typically be irregular, insecure, 
casual and precarious (Gough et al. 2013: 94). Equally, large-scale or high-intensity violence 
may create constraints in the labour market that make self-employment, rather than waged 
employment, more common (Ciarli, Kofol and Menon 2015). Together, these factors render 
unemployment ‘an ambiguous notion, which is notoriously difficult to measure’ (Izzi 2013: 
104; see also Maclay and Skelton 2017 on the example of Liberian unemployment data). As 
such, attention to this wider range of activity is important for understanding how this suite of 
activities, and the diverse constellations and combinations it may encompass, feeds into the 
decision to engage in violence. 
 
Equally, very few people in low-income countries are truly ‘unemployed’ in the sense that 
they engage in no work at all: they are much more likely to be ‘underemployed’ (Blattman 
and Ralston 2015: 1). Underemployment reflects a condition in which people are 
economically active, but sub-optimally so, and are either actively seeking more employment 
opportunities, or would do so if they thought these prospects were realistic. Critically, 
previous reviews have found that ‘underemployment may be as significant as unemployment 
[for violence], as may be irregular employment’ (Cramer 2010: 6). 
 
There is also the issue that the nature of work varies from context to context, and in the lives 
of different individuals. Work that is exploitative, extractive or dehumanising may have a 
particular negative effect on social integration, or perceived political legitimacy, for example, 
and through this, may effect violence. At the same time, work of different kinds may provide 
benefits to young people beyond tangible, economic income streams alone: work may 
provide access to social networks and status. Likewise, having no, or insufficient, work may 
equate to more than simply the loss of income or material poverty, but may correspond to 
constructions of particular youth identities (Oosterom et al. 2016: 7) which in turn may 
motivate participation in violence. 
 
Concepts and definitions of work concern not only different kinds of different kinds of work, 
but also how scholars conceptualise work differently. Conceiving of work as a stage rather 
than an activity, is prominent in conceptualisations of school-to-work transitions. In this 
literature, it is the blockage, dysfunction, disruption or other challenges to this transition that 
account for participation in violence, rather than conceptualising of work as an activity or 
distraction (see Kurtenbach 2014). This blocked transition results in a status of ‘waithood’ as 
a problem for university graduates, whose prospects are disrupted when labour market 
demands do not match their level of education or training (Kurtenbach 2014: 122; Dhillon 
and Yousef 2009). 
 
2.2  Youth 
Definitions of youth are also extremely diverse. Common approaches include simple age-
based definitions; and relying on socially constructed definitions (defined by markers such as 
marriage, starting a family, dependent to contributor in a household). The latter in particular 
are likely to differ across context, but may also differ within the same societies, across 
genders, time, communities and geographies (Frederiksen and Munive 2010). 
 
Definitions and conceptions of youth that are grounded in social constructions and contexts 
are important for our understanding of youth unemployment and violence. Underpinning 
much of the research on youth unemployment and violence are two broad, if often implicit, 
assumptions: 
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1. Youth disproportionately participate in violence because of a lack of developmental 
maturity; and/or  
2. Youth participate in violence when a large share of youth in the population disrupts the 
social and age hierarchy and renders older members of society unable to control and 
discipline more unruly youth (see discussion in Bricker and Foley 2013; and Hudson 
1999; Hart, Atkins and Youniss 2005).  
 
In both cases, the precise ways in which youth to adult transitions, and youth identities more 
broadly, are socially constructed should therefore shape how and why youth engage in 
violence (see Bricker and Foley 2013, for an overview). 
 
It is also important to recall that youth is an extremely diverse category. Many of the studies 
reviewed for this paper aggregate youth into a single, homogenous category, only, if at all, 
disaggregated by gender (typically, referring to ‘young men’ in a particular age bracket). This 
results in little or no attention to key patterns of social difference, including urban/rural 
distinctions; ethnicity, religion, or degree of social inclusion; or educational or other features 
that often define youth experience. These distinctions are important in the lived experience 
of youth populations. Therefore, we should be attentive to them in our theories and empirical 
tests of how work affects ‘youth’ participation in violence. It is highly likely that work affects 
different youth in different ways, and subsequently, shapes their (non-)participation in 
violence in discrete ways. In particular, in contexts of conflict, formal or informal processes of 
initiation which mark the transition from childhood to adulthood may be disrupted, delayed or 
transformed (Mercy Corps 2015: 11). As such, developing a consensus around definitions of 
youth in contexts of conflict and violence can prove particularly problematic. 
 
2.3  Violence 
In addition to various definitions of work and youth, violence takes many different forms, and 
can play different roles in young people’s lives and choices. In spite of its centrality to the 
question of why young people might choose to participate in violence, the concept itself is 
under-theorised and homogenised in much of the literature. Few studies meaningfully 
differentiate between different forms of violence; different degrees of participation; and the 
discrete effects of violence, including in producing contexts in which young people may feel 
they can actively navigate and negotiate their choice to (not) participate, and those in which 
choices are much more circumscribed. As Brett and Sprecht (2006: 123) note in the context 
of violent conflict:  
 
One of the most significant and yet least-considered aspects of this issue in all 
respects is war itself. Few young people go looking for a war to join; for many, war 
comes to them and becomes part of their normal environment. 
 
For the purposes of simplification, violence can occur anywhere along a spectrum of highly 
organised, collective political violence, such as insurgencies and rebellions; to more 
intermittent or sporadic forms of political violence, such as militia-based violence or vigilante 
violence, or involvement in group that use terror tactics; to criminal, often gang-related 
violence, and interpersonal violence, as well as gendered violence. One of the reasons 
consensus (and associated, robust evidence) on the exact relationship between relationship 
between youth unemployment and violence has been so elusive, is because violence is such 
a diverse category. For example, some evidence suggests there is a link between 
unemployment property crime, but much weaker links to other forms of violent crime, and 
much more limited data on youth unemployment specifically, and various types of violence 
(Izzi 2013: 110).  
 
Although this study will consider the evidence linking youth and work to different types of 
violence as though they are discrete phenomena, it is important to keep several factors in 
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mind. First, violence rarely occurs in a vacuum, and so these forms of violence are more 
likely to be interacting with one another and potentially affecting the intensity and course of 
violence endogenously. Second, evidence suggests that the same individuals, over the 
course of a lifetime, may be engaged in more than one type of violence, or play different 
violent ‘roles’ (for example, moving from rebel groups, to paramilitary or vigilante forces, 
and/or state militaries) at discrete points and without a simple linear pathway, at least in 
high-violence contexts (see Dolan 2000). As such, the disaggregation of violence types is, to 
some degree, artificial, although it provides a useful lens through which to analyse the effect 
of work on young people’s participation in violence of different kinds, and, overall, this 
comparative lens remains under-employed within the existing literature. 
 
Within this diversity, it is also important to recall that state violence – though almost entirely 
ignored by the literature – is another form in which young people may engage in, or 
experience, violence. Most of the research, and almost all policy and development 
interventions in this field, concern youth engagement in non-state violence (rebel groups, 
gangs, and so forth). However, youth involvement in state violence may be related to the 
exercise of power, or aspirations of self-sacrifice (for example, Massing 2007). Additionally, 
state violence can be viewed from the perspective of structural or cultural violence. In such 
conditions, the absence of political instability may actually represent a high (and potentially 
repressive) degree of state control (for example, in Eritrea), which would not be reflected in 
standard measurements of conflict or violence, but may nevertheless have implications for 
youth, and be shaped, in turn, by conditions of youth empowerment and political influence. 
The question of state violence as an aggravating factor is particularly important in counter-
insurgency campaigns, or in campaigns in which criminal activity (and its supposed 
perpetrators, including – writ large – young, unemployed men) is heavily securitised, as in 
Latin American ‘wars on drugs’ and ‘social cleansing’ programmes (Kurtenbach 2014: 129). 
 
In the context of considering the wider universe of violence that occurs in a context, it is 
important to be attentive to violence that may be seen primarily as a form of self-defence, 
community policing, or as self-preservation and protection. Much of the literature on youth 
participation in violence (with the exception of research on gang membership) almost entirely 
ignores the violent contexts in which young people are often drawn into violence. Simplifying 
assumptions instead present a linear narrative in which young people make a choice 
between ‘idleness,’ poverty and unemployment, and participation in violence, but do not ask 
how and what participation in violence secures young people otherwise – for example, 
protection for themselves or their wider networks through association with a violent group. In 
these contexts, the wider violent environment is of critical importance. Irrespective of 
economic incentives, security challenges such as ensuring one’s own safety and protection 
may override otherwise ‘rational’ choices to work or migrate for work, if no other means of 
ensuring safety are available. 
 
In addition to violence taking many different forms, the nature, level and degree of 
participation in that violence varies. This can depend on both the nature of the group: a rural 
insurgency in exile, for example, demands greater participation and (arguably), commitment, 
than participation in an urban-based gang operating in its area of origin. Different types of 
group, with varying degrees of coordination and organisation, may rely on different 
motivations and incentives, thereby complicating a simple causal claim about youth, work 
and violence participation. For example, groups that have direct access to rents or means of 
financial distribution may attract opportunists, while groups with limited resources may recruit 
more heavily from among ‘activists’ or true believers (Weinstein 2006).  
 
Different groups may also require different roles at different levels of participation. Some 
types of violence – for example, irregular, highly asymmetric warfare, or violent organisations 
that recruit relying heavily on club goods – appear to be less dependent on economic 
conditions (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 27). In such contexts, only a small number of 
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militants may be required to perpetrate large-scale violence, therefore suggesting that 
general or widespread conditions of unemployment are not necessary.  
 
Similarly, different kinds of groups may provide different opportunities for work through 
participation, pointing to the complex interrelationship between these seemingly linear 
processes. Violent groups may provide opportunities in relation to work beyond income 
opportunities – for example, opportunities to develop transferable labour skills beyond 
manual labour (see Cramer 2010: 21). 
 
Within the same group, there is theoretical reason to believe the motivations of different 
participants at different levels diverge, alongside some empirical evidence (see Krueger 
2008; Krueger and Malecková 2003). This may vary according to an individual’s position in a 
group structure: for example, leaders may have different incentives, motives and objectives 
as compared to ‘foot soldiers’. If true, this suggests very different practical and policy 
responses to violence for different participants, and where entry points might emerge to 
address, manage and mitigate violence.  
 
Violence also varies according to its temporal dimensions. Many seminal studies on the 
causes of conflict rely on conflict onset (i.e. the start of a conflict) as their measure of 
conflict, rather than – for example – duration, or intensity (see Urdal 2006 for an example 
explicitly exploring youth populations and conflict onset). This may have theoretical 
relevance – as it estimates the risk that a conflict may occur in a given country – but its real-
world, policy and praxis implications are less clear. Different types of conflict may occur or 
begin at the same time, with drastically different implications for policy and practice, but 
models such as these treat all these conflicts as equivalent.  
 
This also feeds into an additional temporal consideration: there is a difference between 
starting an insurgency; participating in violence once under way; protracted violence 
following conflict. As Cramer (2010: 25) notes,  
 
Once violent conflicts get underway, participation can easily become endogenous to 
local dynamics of which organization is in control, what agendas of resentment and 
envy divide people locally, and what experiences of brutalisation by war people have 
already had.  
 
For example, there is robust evidence that income shocks increase crime and conflict 
intensity; but very little to suggest they correspond to the outbreak of new conflicts (Blattman 
and Ralston 2015: 27). The same group may also exhibit different temporal patterns in 
recruitment over time. Some evidence suggests that groups begin with ‘true believers’ and 
gradually, as conflict dynamics themselves come to shape group strategy and priorities, 
come to include more and more opportunistic or income-motivated individuals (see for 
example, the case of ‘Boko Haram’ in Nigeria, NSRP 2015). 
 
Violence participation also entails different geographies. A particularly high-profile policy 
concern is the ‘foreign fighter’ phenomenon, whereby (predominantly young) people travel 
great distances to become members of violent organisations. Elsewhere, however, young 
people may participate in violence closer to home, at a lower level, or they may become 
displaced by violence, and as a consequence, then fail to enter the labour market, and then 
participate in violence. 
 
In addition to different motivations for participation, a related question is the relationship 
between work and support for violence. While not directly related to participation, wider 
support for terrorism may create an enabling environment in which violence can take place 
(the concept of ‘the sea in which the fish swim’), whereby populations are less likely to 
denounce violence to the state, or share information on violent actors with the state 
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(Blattman and Ralston 2015). Alternatively, support for violence may be a first step on a 
process of radicalisation and ultimate participation. Both mechanisms suggest the 
significance of considering the role of work and support for violence (Khalil 2014).  
 
 
3 Issues of data 
In a context of rising youth populations, there is a dominant consensus that youth 
unemployment can be directly linked to participation in violence, in a linear way (see Cramer 
2010 for an overview; also Urdal 2006). However, this consensus has emerged in a context 
of limited evidence and data on youth, youth work and un/under-employment, and youth 
participation in violence. According to one systematic evidence review, studies on 
employment in fragile states typically boast a ‘theoretical rather than empirical bias, with 
many studies and policy documents being based on the assumption that employment 
creation will promote poverty reduction and stability’ (Holmes et al. 2013: v). 
 
Problems arise at each stage of the research question, and at the intersection of the various 
factors of work, youth and violence. In the first instance, and affecting all variables, is the 
scale at which data is collected, and the degree of disaggregation this allows. Violence is 
typically a localised phenomenon (see Cederman and Gleditsch 2009), but data on work, 
youth and violence are all much more systematically available at national levels, and with 
little attention to social categories and other potential ‘horizontal inequalities’ (see discussion 
of aggregate unemployment figures in Northern Ireland, in Cramer 2010: 19). This can have 
the effect of obscuring pockets of unemployment, youth marginalisation, or violence, by 
aggregating these into national averages, with little attention to the causal mechanisms that 
operate at a highly differentiated level. 
 
Each individual variable also presents unique problems: in the first instance, work, 
unemployment, and under-employment are all contested, and difficult to operationalise. As 
discussed above, very few people in low-income countries are ‘unemployed’ in the 
conventional sense of the word, but the degree to which under-employment is or can be 
accurately measured in national or otherwise comparable statistics is very limited. Youth 
engagement in the labour market is particularly difficult to measure and conceptualise, as 
young people who have been discouraged from looking for work, but are able to work, would 
be excluded from conventional unemployment figures (Gough et al. 2013: 95). 
 
Youth is also contested and difficult to measure, although age-based definitions provide one 
option that is commonly used by international and national organisations. However, 
measuring youth in relation to the overall population is an issue of considerable debate. 
Bricker and Foley (2013) measure not the youth size of the population overall, but its size 
relative to the total labour force, to produce a ‘youth risk factor’ which they argue side-step 
some of the data paucity issues that restrict other samples and models. The authors argue 
that it is the ratio of youth population to the total labour force that exerts economic and social 
pressure, and is positively correlated with violence. Some authors seek to mitigate the 
paucity of data through the use of instrumental variables in models testing the effect of youth 
unemployment on violence (see Azeng and Yogo 2013), but much more progress is needed 
in this area in order to robustly assess central claims of this literature in a reliable and 
systematic way. 
 
There is also the question of reporting and capturing violence accurately. There are 
challenges with accurately gathering reliable, comparable reports of violence that can be 
analysed systematically over time. This is an issue not only of access (which is particularly 
problematic in conflict-affected contexts), but also of reporting, biases, and the politicisation 
of violence reports. This is further complicated by the question of the location of violence. 
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Many models which seek to disaggregate the locations of violence by geo-coded 
information, associate that violence with the location in which it occurs. However, violent 
groups may travel to sites a long distance from their locations of recruitment, in order to 
target enemies, or particularly high-value targets (see Hegre, Østby and Raleigh 2009). 
 
These factors also all interact: both political violence and un/under-employment data are 
non-randomly associated with violence itself. In other words, high levels of insecurity 
produce conditions in which data is more difficult to collect, leading to the generation of 
samples that are systematically and non-randomly biased in favour of countries with low to 
moderate levels of violence, or the long-run absence of violence. Consequently, models are 
undermined by a lack of controls, a lack of baseline data, and a lack of longitudinal data as a 
result of the restrictions on conducting research in high-violence contexts (Holmes et al. 
2013: 25). Social relations also intersect to condition not only work conditions, but also the 
likelihood of reporting violence. As Cramer (2010: 7) summarises, rural women whose 
husbands were employed in Kerala, India, were significantly less likely to report intimate 
partner violence than women with unemployed husbands. Meanwhile, in a wider study 
across India, women who were employed but whose husbands were unemployed were twice 
as likely to report physical violence than those whose husbands were employed. 
 
There is also a related question of missing variables. Violence and unemployment may be 
non-randomly associated with an external, missing variable. For example, Krishnan et al. 
(2010) find that in Bangalore ‘over two thirds of women who had ever experienced domestic 
violence reported that their husbands had difficulty finding or keeping a job, as compared to 
about half of those who had not experienced violence’. However, it is plausible that there is a 
third, missing, variable that accounts for both inability to hold a job (unemployment) and 
violence against partners, that is unaccounted for in conventional, linear explanations. 
Related, is the question of reverse causality, whereby long-run political instability produces 
high levels of unemployment, and in turn (or in conjunction) predicts future violence, without 
unemployment per se playing a critical role (Azeng and Yogo 2015; Colino 2012). 
 
Relatedly, there is the question of how to control for intersecting, intervening and 
compounding factors, which may render unemployment a volatile and potentially incendiary 
status among some individuals/groups, and not among others. For example, past exposure 
to violence, or psychological factors, that may compound the economic and pecuniary 
significance of unemployment (Cramer 2010: 8).  
 
The proliferation of donor-funded interventions to support youth work, and through this, 
violence reduction, has done little to address this data gap. Walton (2010: 1) finds, 
 
both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes 
as a stand-alone tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak. Donor 
interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to 
demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the 
impact on conflict. 
 
The result of this has been a growing emphasis on holistic, comprehensive and integrated 
approaches to violence reduction, which include employment alongside a suite of other 
interventions. However, this too brings challenges for researchers: even the most ardent 
proponents of theorists agree that un/under-employment alone is not a singular driver of 
violence. Consequently, most interventions that facilitate rigorous research rely on a 
combination of investments (for example, skills training for employment prospects and a 
cash injection), making the specific role of work in deterring violence more difficult to 
estimate. This ‘shotgun approach […] may lead to inefficient program components that are 
costly to deliver’ (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 5). The result is a context in which 
interventions that link labour market interventions to employment, and employment to 
stability ‘are based first on faith, second on theory, and last on evidence’ (Blattman and 
Ralston 2015: ii). 
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4 Theories and evidence 
Generally speaking, research and evidence on the relationship between work, youth and 
violence falls under two broad categories:  
 
1. Studies that ask what role work – as provided/created in the ‘natural’ economic cycle – 
plays in participation in violence, violent crime, radicalisation, etc.; and 
2. Those that look to assess the efficacy of targeted employment creation programmes/ 
interventions in reducing violence. 
 
The former tend to rely on macro-theories of conflict onset – for example, ‘greed’ vs 
‘grievance’ – premised on (but rarely evidenced by) individual-level cases of participation, 
motivation and psychology. They typically look to the wider conditions in which violence 
occurs, and identify probabilistic relationships between large-scale conflict onset, or 
widespread violent crime, and social and economic conditions including unemployment, 
extrapolating that these lead to frustrations or other motivations that fuel violent conflict. For 
example, in his seminal work on the topic, Urdal (2006) finds that countries wherein youth 
constitute 35 per cent or more of the total population (those characterised by a ‘youth bulge’) 
are 150 per cent more likely to experience armed conflict than countries with an age 
structure closer to developed countries, controlling for a range of variables.  
 
These studies, however, suffer from what Cramer (2010: 20) refers as the ‘ecological 
inference challenge’, whereby even disaggregated data by community ‘does not establish 
that unemployed people were the main or only participants in organizations using or 
supporting political violence’. (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 27) refer to this as the ‘unit of 
analysis’ problem:  
 
We are interested in understanding the individual person’s decision to rebel or commit 
a crime, or perhaps a group’s ability to recruit, but most of the evidence is at a regional 
or national level. Income shocks do not just affect a group’s ability to recruit, however. 
Falling prices or output can affect government revenues or counterinsurgency 
capacity, both at the national and local level. Thus it’s hard to take the correlation 
between income shocks and violence as evidence for the ease of recruitment and 
other opportunity cost accounts of rebellion. 
 
To side-step this aggregation from the individual to the community, researchers need data 
on individuals directly participating (or with past experience of participating) in violence, 
which constitutes the latter form of study. These are often based on programmatic 
evaluations and assessments of the effects of donor or government interventions, such as 
workfare programmes, skills training and employment generating programmes for ‘high-risk’, 
‘vulnerable’, or ‘reformed’ young people. These tend to be conducted in violence-affected 
countries, areas, communities, or among populations with exposure to and/or experience of 
violence. However, these present a second methodological risk of selecting on the 
dependent variable of existing violence participation, or at the very least, exposure, which 
may bias results. In such cases, research is carried out with, for example, combatants or 
former combatants who are asked about their motivations, and findings are then generalised 
to the wider population, when unemployment is almost certainly more widespread (Izzi 2013: 
110).  
 
The following section reviews the evidence supporting discrete theories of youth 
unemployment and its role in violence.  
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4.1  Economic incentives 
Economic theories of the role of youth un/under-employment in violence participation 
suggest that young people participate in violence in order to satisfy financial and material 
needs. This view of violence participation, broadly defined, assumes that violence is an 
occupational choice, and roughly equivalent to other options for securing an income and 
meeting material needs. This view of ‘war as work’ is not strictly confined to economic lenses 
on violence: for example, Hoffman (2011: 34) develops an anthropological and sociopolitical 
approach in the same framing of ‘violence as literal work… war as labor’. Nevertheless, this 
view remains more prominent within this disciplinary lens, than those in which greater 
emphasis is placed on violence as a means of enacting social or political change, or meeting 
social or normative needs (discussed below). Economic theories that place an emphasis on 
opportunity costs, strictly defined, assume (simplifying) that young people have no 
alternative use of time (such as full-time employment), and therefore, engage in violence. 
From an economic perspective, the existence of a large, young and unemployed cohort in 
the population lowers the cost of recruitment for violent organisations, because organisations 
need to promise less in exchange for the relatively more abundant free time young people 
are assumed to have.  
 
At the macro level, Urdal (2012: 2) has found that the existence of a large, young cohort 
lowers the costs of recruitment into violent organisations. He finds that large youth cohorts 
alone are positively related to unemployment, by virtue of the larger number of young people 
available in the labour force; and independently, the size of the youth cohort itself reduces 
prospects for young people. This approach motivates a large share of aid spending on 
reducing political violence, postulated on the assumption that employed men are less likely 
to participate in insurgent violence (Berman et al. 2011: 497).  
 
The theorised connection is clear, but the empirical evidence on this relationship is mixed, 
particularly in relation to applicability to various types of violence. For example, several 
studies propose a direct link between employment opportunities and youth participation in 
state violence. In their study of young people’s choice to participate in armed conflict, Brett 
and Sprecht (2006: 22) present qualitative interview evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
limited employment prospects, and through these, economic opportunities, fed into the 
decision to join the military:  
 
[In the army] you can go out and see the world. You can get life experience, OK… It 
proves you don’t have to go and work in a factory. Doing the same thing day in, day 
out. Bored, you know. (Stephen, United Kingdom) 
 
The shortest route, the easiest job in the Congo is the army: they are always hiring; 
above all they are paid. (Albert, Congo-Brazzaville)  
(quoted in Brett and Sprecht 2006: 22) 
 
In the wider context of violence research (and by far, the largest portion of the literature does 
not concern state violence), several challenges to the theory have been put forward. For 
example, the theory of economic incentives, and through these, the role of unemployment, in 
motivating violence, is based on an assumption that participation in violence (typically 
referring to large-scale, organised violence such as conflict) is ‘a full-time occupation, in the 
sense that individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same 
time.’ (Berman et al. 2011: 497). However, it is not clear that participation in violence and 
employment are mutually exclusive, or at least, not for all types of conflict. For instance, 
Kurtenbach (2014: 129), citing existing empirical studies, finds that 57 per cent of 
Guatemala’s gang members simultaneously work in the ‘noncriminal economy’.  
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Similar evidence has been found in relation to self-reported criminal activity in the United 
States, and participation in the labour market, leading Blattman and Ralston (2015: 23) to 
conclude that ‘while crime versus legitimate work is often frame as an either/or decision, in 
fact a poor person’s best strategy might be both. Illegitimate activities are just another risky, 
uncertain occupation to add to one’s portfolio of work’. The implications of these findings are 
twofold: first, they suggest that participation in violence and employment are not mutually 
exclusive, and can in fact co-exist, at least for some forms of violence. Second, they indicate 
that while participation in certain forms of violence may be sensitive to changes in the labour 
market or wages, this may be expected to have the greatest effect on shifting people’s 
‘portfolio’ to encompass more non-criminal activity, without succeeding in getting them to 
‘exit’ or abandon criminal violence entirely. 
 
The differentiated effect of work, through economic incentives, on discrete forms of violence 
appears to be borne out by available data. For example, evidence from the US suggests that 
increases in unemployment rates are associated with a corresponding increase in the 
frequency of property crime; but violent crime, by contrast, ‘does not vary as systematically 
with the unemployment rate. To the extent that it does, the explanation consistent with the 
pure opportunity cost story is that violence is a complement to or by-product of certain forms 
of crime (such as drug dealing)’ (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 28). Similarly, Aaltonen et al. 
(2013) study the effect of unemployment on criminal behaviour in Nordic countries and find 
no meaningful relationship between unemployment status and violent crime (although they 
do for property crime). They do find that individuals who commit violent crimes tend on 
average to have been unemployed for longer, although they do not necessarily commit these 
crimes while unemployed (Aaltonen et al. 2013: 582). The findings support an economic 
choice theory of the relationship between unemployment and crime, but the results do not 
demonstrate a clear relationship between unemployment and violent crime, and offer little 
insight to the demographic (youth) features of this relationship. 
 
With regards to higher-intensity violence, such as organised insurgencies, we might expect 
the effect of un/under-employment on violence to be more pronounced, particularly as 
participation in an insurgency may demand a full-time commitment, and therefore render 
employment and violence participation largely mutually exclusive. Employment creation is a 
common policy response in post-conflict contexts, through which it is expected to reduce 
violence by creating labour demand that absorbs ex-combatants, offers legitimate means of 
securing incomes, and ‘reduces incentives which may contribute to instability’ (Holmes et al. 
2013: 6).  
 
There is some evidence to suggest this is effective. A field experiment that sought to 
reintegrate young men in Liberia after the conflict there provided a mix of agricultural 
training, capital inputs, and counselling to a treatment group, and compared results to a 
control group who did not receive the same interventions. The results show that after the 
programme ended, men who were in the treatment group were more likely to be engaged in 
farm employment, to have shifted their work away from illicit activities such as mining, and 
reported reduced interest in mercenary work (after war broke out in neighbouring Ivory 
Coast, and mercenary recruitment began in Liberia). Specifically, men in the treatment group 
were 24 per cent less likely than those in the control group to participate in one of 12 direct 
measures of mercenary recruitment activity, such as talking to a commander, or attending a 
recruitment meeting (Blattman and Annan 2016). However, consistent with other results 
above, the programme showed no effect on participation in lower-intensity forms of violence, 
such as engaging in physical fights or property destruction, even though a dedicated 
programme counselling component sought to teach methods of non-violent conflict 
resolution (World Bank 2014). While promising, these findings should be contrasted with 
analyses that suggest that employment creation programmes and associated benefits (such 
as training and cash transfer programmes) for former combatants further exacerbate 
tensions between former combatant and civilian populations. These may ‘create the 
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perception that fighting pays’, serving to ‘divide youths in post-conflict societies into two 
basic categories: ex-combatants and others’ in ways which may ultimately, at worst, serve to 
further incentivise (or at least fail to disincentivise) violence participation (Ebiede 2017: 13). 
 
Other quasi-experimental studies have found similar effects, but have emphasised the 
interactive effect of employment (and income generation) on other conditions of vulnerability, 
positing a less direct causal pathway between youth, work and violence. For example, 
making use of the phased roll-out of the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee 
scheme to implement a quasi-experimental study, Fetzer (2014) found that this large-scale 
work programme may have moderated insurgency violence, by providing a means of social 
insurgence and employment in times of need. Specifically, the author found that the work 
programme moderated the effects of poor rains – otherwise, correlated with the intensity of 
government-Naxalite violence – concluding that ‘one of the key drivers of insurgency can be 
moderated through the effective introduction and provision of social insurance’ (Fetzer 2014: 
28). Unfortunately, the study did not disaggregate by age, and therefore offers little insight 
into the specific dynamics of youth, work and violence. 
 
Several authors, however, have challenged these findings, or at least their applicability to 
other forms of violent conflict. While studies of large-scale and high-intensity conflicts 
typically restrict their samples to mass insurgencies, other forms of equally destructive and 
devastating warfare may rely on discrete forms of recruitment and mobilisation. For example, 
certain forms of irregular warfare (or participation in armed organisations characterised as 
‘terrorist’) may not demand mass participation, instead depending on a small sub-section of 
the population to inflict damage. Alternatively, they may rely on recruitment from beyond the 
site of violence alone – for example, from regional countries, and/or international ‘foreign 
fighters’. In such cases, the underlying assumptions that participation in violence is either a 
low-skill occupation, in which case the creation of mass employment programmes will 
reduce the number of recruits, or that the supply of labour domestically is a binding 
constraint on organisations, may not hold. 
 
Available evidence on these dynamics is limited, but one study finds that unemployment is 
negatively associated with violent insurgency levels in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines, 
in contrast to conventional opportunity cost arguments (Berman et al. 2011). The authors 
argue that this a function of a similar opportunity cost mechanism, but operationalise this as 
information theoretics. They contend that because conflict creates a large pool of poor, 
unemployed people from which the government (or other counterinsurgent forces) can buy 
information on insurgents, government forces are therefore able to more effectively tackle 
the insurgency, and violence reduces as a result (Berman et al. 2011). Additionally, they 
argue that measures taken to enhance security (such as checkpoints, building walls, etc.) 
may have both a negative effect on employment, and a positive effect on levels of 
insurgency. For example, the construction of checkpoints and security barriers may reduce 
labour movement, trade, and access to markets, thereby indirectly effecting employment. 
Importantly, however, these findings extrapolate from survey data about specific, individual 
unemployment, and general levels of insurgency, without tracing a clear line between 
individual unemployment (or even youth unemployment specifically) and participation in 
violence; and are not available disaggregated by age or age category. 
 
In line with this, what limited evidence there is available for participation in conventionally-
labelled ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist groups’ has typically failed to demonstrate a robust 
relationship between unemployment and terrorism, or that ‘terrorist perpetrators are more 
likely than the average person to come from a lower socio-economic background or to be 
uneducated, unemployed, and economically distressed’ (Piazza 2011: 339; see also Piazza 
2006; Krueger and Malecková 2003). In addition, there is almost no robust evidence on the 
relationship, specifically, between unemployment and youth participation in terrorism, as 
19 
 
limited information is available disaggregating group membership in these clandestine 
organisations. 
 
In one exception, Botha (2014) presents analysis of interviews conducted with 95 individuals 
in Kenya associated with the militant Islamist group, Al-Shabaab (including recruits, and 
fighters returned from neighbouring Somalia), and 46 relatives of individuals associated with 
the group. According to respondents, 57 per cent joined Al-Shabaab before they turned 25, 
and a further 21 per cent, before they were 30, making the group (whose name translates 
literally as ‘The Youth’) predominantly youth-focused. The author found very little evidence of 
financial and economic incentives motivating participation among the respondents: the 
majority of respondents referred to religion as their primary motivation for joining; only 6 per 
cent combined religion with economic reasons; and just 4 per cent referred to economic 
reasons primarily. As such, only one in ten respondents in total referred to economic 
motivations in any way. Botha (2014: 207) concludes:  
 
This places a question mark on the ideological commitment of these individuals. In 
other words, if these individuals had access to other employment opportunities they 
would not have joined these organizations. At the same time, it also places a question 
mark to the success of strategies — based on a small percentage of respondents who 
raised employment — that by offering only employment opportunities, individuals will 
not join these groups. 
 
Another study suggested that the effect of unemployment among the youth population varies 
by gender, with young male unemployment being a stronger predictor of violence than young 
female unemployment rates (Caruso and Gavrilova 2012), but the strength of evidence and 
emergence of a consensus around this issue remains weak. 
 
Ultimately, the evidence suggests that economic incentives play a role in participation in 
certain forms of violence. The most substantial area of disagreement in the literature is not 
whether this is the case, but precisely how much of a role these play, at which level, and in 
what kinds of violence. The strength of this relationship, the conditions in which it is relevant, 
and the degree to which it influences participation alone, or in conjunction with other factors, 
remains unclear. 
 
 
 
4.2  Grievances and marginalisation 
While economic theories suggest that youth participation in violence can be reduced to the 
material incentives related to un/under-employment, a broader framing suggests that while 
Box 4.1   Economic incentives, unemployment and youth participation in 
violence 
 Some evidence to suggest unemployment and economic incentives motivate 
participation in crime, but little evidence of a relationship between violent crime. 
Both violence participation and employment are mutually compatible for at least 
some forms of violence. 
 Mixed evidence on the relationship between economic incentives, unemployment 
and youth participation in higher-intensity violence: evidence of both a positive and 
a negative relationship. The effect may be contextually specific. 
 Limited robust evidence that economic incentives alone, or predominantly, 
influence participation in terrorism. 
 Limited data on youth economic incentives and unemployment specifically, 
highlighting a significant gap in existing research. 
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economic hardship and, more generally, un/under-employment play a role, this is primarily 
through the creation of grievances and the perception of marginalisation which fuels 
violence. In this framing, un/under-employment may be sources of alienation and frustration, 
rather than simply financial hardship.  
 
In contrast to the economic literature, which operationalises violence participation as an 
income-generating activity alone, ethnographic accounts often emphasise the way in which 
un/under-employment reflect systematic discrimination through labour markets, the 
education system, and financial institutions, which produce grievance and resentment. This 
broader view reflects the way in which disenfranchisement and discrimination has political, 
as well as economic, dimensions (Miguel 2007). Underlying this, is the contention that labour 
is not simply a commodity like any other, but rather because it is a human, social 
phenomenon, it is a social institution, which incorporates social norms and (of particular 
relevance to this study), ideas of status and fairness (Solow 1990). 
 
The primary challenge to robustly assessing this relationship is the difficulty in measuring 
non-material explanations, incentives and motives (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 30). Azeng 
and Yogo (2015) use fixed-effects regression and instrumental variables in a study of           
24 developing countries from 1980–2010, and find that youth unemployment is significantly, 
but weakly, associated with an increase in the risk of political instability. In this context, 
however, instability is operationalised as a composite measure of executive changes (which 
may not necessarily involve violence) and military instability (including armed conflict and 
civilian deaths from conflict), and does not directly gauge youth participation. They find 
stronger evidence for a relationship between youth unemployment and anti-government 
demonstrations, consistent with scholarship that emphasises the importance of 
disaggregating between discrete forms of violence, but note that these are unlikely to result 
in national-level unrest. The authors argue that the relationship is a result of socioeconomic 
inequalities and high rates of corruption, associated with large-scale youth unemployment.  
In the qualitative literature, a number of studies have sought to understand experiences and 
motivations for participating in violence more directly. Mercy Corps (2015) draws on 
interview and survey evidence to argue that there is, 
 
no relationship between joblessness and a young person’s willingness to engage in, or 
support, political violence… For many youth, narratives of grievance are animated by 
the shortcomings of the state itself, which is weak, venal or violent. Or all three. Young 
people take up the gun not because they are poor, but because they are angry.  
(Mercy Corps 2015: 2)  
 
The study draws on data from Afghanistan, Colombia and Somalia, and argues that while 
unemployment can be symptomatic of wider sources of frustration and marginalisation for 
young people, ‘employment status alone does not appear to determine whether a young 
person is likely to join an insurgency’ (Mercy Corps 2015: 17). The research analyses 
surveys of graduates of vocational training who had successfully found jobs, but whose 
responses showed that employment had no measurable effect on levels of support for 
armed insurgents. 
 
These findings highlight the degree to which work represents other perceived injustices and 
concerns in society. For example, Walton (2010: 1) argues: 
 
While many early recruits to rebel groups such as the RUF in Sierra Leone or the JVP 
in Sri Lanka were unemployed, for example, the motivating factor behind violence was 
not unemployment per se, but rather grievance at an unjust and corrupt patrimonial 
system that increasingly shut out young people. 
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Other studies have also explicitly linked the question of grievances to work and employment 
opportunities, by arguing that the lack of employment produces not only economic incentives 
for young people to participate in violence, but also a sense of anger and,  
 
a clear sense that they were being excluded from the labor market and from the 
power, opportunities and resources that the older generation – and particularly a few 
members of the older generation – has.  
(Barker and Ricardo 2005: 34) 
 
In this framework, employment status and opportunities provide not only one of a composite 
set of issues over which grievances arise, but more specifically, that they diverge from 
economic theories in that employment creates a specific sense of frustration and 
marginalisation that is not simply financially motivated. The authors quoted respondents who 
had been involved in violence, stating:  
 
Since 1981, I have been involved in every riot there has been. If the violence came, I 
would be involved. I had no work. I had nothing to do. Why should I not get involved? 
Three months ago, I became employed as a civil servant. Now that I am getting my 
daily bread, why should I get involved? Lots of men do not have this [stable work].  
 
and  
 
Some of our leaders used this violence to achieve their aims […] To make their 
candidates stronger […] They know we don’t have jobs (and that we’ll get involved in 
this violence).  
(Barker and Ricardo 2005: 33) 
 
In an attempt to address the literature that speaks to distinct types of violence, Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2008) explore the determinants of participation (of predominantly young 
people) in both insurgency and counterinsurgency forces in the same Sierra Leonean 
context, through micro-level survey data with over 1,000 respondents. The authors find 
some evidence for competing theories (including economic incentives and grievance-based 
arguments), although looting and predatory activities appeared to play a lesser role among 
rank-and-file soldiers, as opposed to leadership. The results indicate that the interaction 
between these factors remains under-theorised and imprecisely explained in existing 
literature. Importantly, however, the authors find that typical ‘grievance’ proxies are 
significant and positively associated with participation in both state and non-state forces, 
suggesting that these correspond to a higher likelihood of violence participation generally, 
rather than non-state (or insurgency) violence specifically. Hoffman’s (2011: 37) study of 
combatants in the same conflict comes to a similar conclusion, summarising an interaction in 
which a pro-government fighter identified strongly with the complaints and grievances of 
Sierra Leonean youth outlined by RUF literature. 
 
With regards to the high-profile question of participation in terrorist organisations, and 
particularly, the phenomenon of the ‘foreign fighter’, very little evidence has robustly 
demonstrated the role that work might play in producing grievances, that in turn account for 
the choice to participate in violence. In many ways, this phenomenon – requiring, as it does, 
significant investment and resources of time and travel on the part of the individual – holds 
constant some of the factors that complicate studies of participation in violence in active (and 
geographically proximate) conflict zones, as it would appear to entail a more active choice 
and greater agency in relation to participation.  
 
In a recent contribution to this literature, Verwimp (2015) has concluded that there is a 
significant and positive correlation between the gap in employment between EU/non-EU 
nationals and the number of recorded foreign fighters in Syria per million inhabitants of 
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several EU countries. The results hold with an alternative specification of the model, which 
explicitly considers the gap in employment between 25–34-year-old non-migrants and 
second-generation migrants of the same age group. In other words, the less likely these 
groups are to be employed, the higher likelihood that a country will see a larger number of 
foreign fighters in Syria. The author further controls for school and student socioeconomic 
status, as well as level of education of migrants on entry, and finds that these factors can 
only partially account for the poor performance of migrants in some of the highest ‘foreign 
fighter’-contributing EU countries. In other words, structural conditions within the school 
system itself may account for poor performance, and interact with unemployment. Although 
the findings are preliminary, they may be cautiously interpreted to lend support to a 
grievance-based explanation of the marginalising effect of unemployment, and constitutive 
educational constraints, on the choice to engage in violence overseas. 
 
Together, these results suggest that jobs, at least through the economic incentives they 
create alone, may be insufficient to deter participation in violence. For at least some forms of 
violence, other factors, including injustices and wider patterns of marginalisation, of which 
work status may be one, may need to be addressed. 
 
Box 4.2  Grievances, marginalisation, unemployment and youth participation in 
violence 
 Considerable consensus around the fact that unemployment, or work status more 
generally, may play a role in the generation of wider grievances, rooted in social, 
economic and political marginalisation, which may in turn shape the decision to 
participate in violence. 
 Some evidence to suggest that employment alone does not effectively reduce 
support for violence, if perceptions of inequality or injustice persist. 
 Given the broad definition of such grievances, however, specifying the degree to 
which work status features in the decision to engage in violence, is difficult, as it 
often forms one of a suite of factors that individuals self-report; and/or feature in 
econometric models. 
 
4.3  Social norms and expectations 
An alternative pathway through which youth employment status or experiences may shape 
decisions to participate in violence is through the social norms and expectations that are 
embedded in work. Because youth status more broadly defined corresponds to a period of 
transition between childhood and adulthood, these expectations, and the construction of 
identities in line or in conflict with social norms, may be particularly acutely felt by young 
people. Although young women are also active agents in violence, armed conflict and the 
activities that sustain it (see Stewart 2010; Dietrich and Quain 2014), the vast majority of the 
literature concerning social norms and expectations is focused on the construction of 
militarised or hegemonic masculinities, and the ways in which these promote or produce 
violence. 
 
In the simplest formulation, un/under-employment may be linked to strain and stress, 
particularly around pressure to deliver on social norms and expectations, and therefore is 
more likely to induce violence (Aaltonen et al. 2013: 570). In this line of argument, 
unemployment may conflict with expected social roles for young men, such as serving as a 
‘breadwinner’ in a household. This theory has been particularly prominent in explanations of 
intimate partner and gender-based violence. Ethnographic studies suggest that widespread 
unemployment can lead ‘to a growing number of young men basing their authority vis-á-vis 
women on bodily powers […] rather than on economic powers and social status’ (Groes-
Green 2009: 286). For example, jobs crises have been linked to higher instances of intimate 
partner violence in several countries, with increases in reports of domestic violence linked to 
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jobs losses and financial concerns (Ortiz 2012: 22), but the data available do not provide 
evidence on the role of young people specifically.  
 
Violence participation may also be shaped by experiences of work, or contacts formed 
through it, more broadly defined. Although not explicitly concerned with the role of work as a 
feature of conflict, Parkinson’s (2013) study of mobilisation and violent participation in 
Palestinian organisations in Lebanon in the 1980s contends that mobilisation into violence 
by various pathways was shaped by systematic overlaps between militant hierarchical 
structures and everyday social networks, suggesting the importance of social connections in 
conflict mobilisation. Viterna (2006) suggests similar networks and situation contexts shaped 
the pathways by which Salvadoran women became involved in guerrilla forces there. 
Extrapolating from social networks generally defined, to those which may emerge and be 
shaped through work, these studies may be read to suggest that professional and labour 
networks could play an important, if understudied, role in violence participation. 
 
Conversely, participation in violence may offer what participants cannot find through 
employment – either because it is not available, or because the nature of work available 
precludes it – including, income, but also a source of respect and status, access to social 
ties and belonging. As Cramer (2010: 6) notes,  
 
if there is a social significance to labour market participation beyond the 
straightforwardly pecuniary this involves norms of fairness, ideas of status, and the 
value derived from belonging to group and forging social ties through a variety of 
interactions. Participation in groups using violence – gangs, militia, insurgent groups, 
formal security forces – will most likely also be partly or chiefly ‘about’ these same 
values, sources of identity, and opportunities for social ties. 
 
In this vein, Hoffman (2011: 38) references the accounts of young combatants in the Sierra 
Leonean civil war, noting the extent to which ‘youth experienced themselves not as partisans 
but as young men sharing in the jouissance of combat and camaraderie’, quoting one former 
commander who described ‘the jungle life’ as ‘like fulfilling a desire. A commitment, you 
understand. It’s like taking up a challenge or meeting a challenge’.  
 
Unemployment and social norms may also feed into violence in contexts of more widespread 
conflict. A study of violent cattle raiding in South Sudan found that unemployment and 
restricted economic opportunities, coupled with increasing bride prices, and institutionalised 
social pressure to participate in violent raids and successfully secure cattle as a rite of 
passage for young men, all fed into the perpetuation of this violent cycle. The study contends 
that, ‘In the context of large-scale unemployment and few educational opportunities, it is not 
easy for men to achieve a sense of identity and to live up to social expectations of them as 
men’ (Saferworld 2014: 7). In the same country context, youth participation in more 
organised violence, such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), or other ethno-
communally mobilised militias, has also been conceptualised as among ‘symbols of power 
that bring a sense of identity, masculinity, worth, and place’ (Patinkin 2014).  
 
Similar factors have been identified in the case of Kosovo. There, high unemployment, 
among a range of other conditions, were seen to ‘make it more difficult for men to define 
themselves through the role of the breadwinner’. These in turn fed into ‘a narrative of 
threatened masculinity […] reinforced by a more general narrative of gender crisis, [that] 
offered militarism as a way of winning back both individual and national dignity’ (Bracewell 
2000: 577, 567). Equally, in DRC, scholars have linked child and youth participation in 
violence to a socially constructed ‘ethics of security’, through which ‘the phenomenon of child 
soldiering has been made possible by a moral code which stresses obedience to a higher 
cause’ (Hoffmann 2010: 341). In the latter context, however, it would be important to 
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differentiate between children and youth, in order to better specify how and when agency 
and choice may shape participation. 
 
In all of these cases, non-material benefits of participation or group membership may 
compensate for the risks and uncertainty associated with involvement in violence, and 
certainly complicate the picture of violence as an ‘occupational choice’ motivated by material 
incentives alone (Blattman and Ralston 2015: 23). In such cases, the role of work may be 
twofold: first, that it provides a means of accessing these non-material benefits and fulfilling 
particular norms and expectations; and second, that in the absence of it, violence provides 
an alternative pathway to securing these. From a policy and preventive perspective, 
therefore, employment can most effectively support reductions in violence if it provides other 
pathways to esteem. This therefore suggests that both the context in which such an 
intervention takes place, and the nature of that employment, would be central to 
effectiveness. Unfortunately, very little comparative research has been conducted to trace 
these differential effects. At the same time, it is important to recall that in most cases, 
participation in violence remains the domain of a minority of young men, in spite of the fact 
that social constructions of gender, and experiences of un/under-employment, may be 
widespread (Saferworld 2014: 10). More research could usefully highlight where, why and 
among whom militarised masculinities gain traction, and are effectively leveraged to mobilise 
or motivate violence, and when they are not. 
 
Box 4.3  Social norms and expectations, unemployment and youth participation in 
violence 
 Work status has been linked to non-material factors, including anxiety, frustration, 
and pressure over meeting and performing social norms and expectations, 
particularly for young men.  
 ‘Militarised masculinities’ can be directly or indirectly shaped by un/under-
employment in different ways, including through the effects of loss of income, and 
the impact of reduced social status, both of which may be mitigated by 
participation in violent groups. 
 Although young women may also participate in violence in different forms, very 
little research has explored the construction of gender, social norms and 
expectations in relation to this, and less still on the role work may play in the 
decision to participate. The vast majority of literature is devoted to understanding 
constructions of male identities in this respect. 
 It remains unclear what effect different types of work might have on violence, 
mediated through social norms, although there is a strong theoretical reason to 
assume this should be significant. There is also insufficient evidence to identify 
why widely socially constructed concepts of masculinity serve to motivate and 
mobilise violence among some young men, and not others, even in conditions of 
widespread unemployment. 
 
 
5 Gaps and opportunities for future research 
The preceding evidence review explores three major theories and mechanisms by which 
work may play a role in young people’s decision to participate in violence. It also suggests 
several gaps in existing research, and opportunities for future research.  
 
The first and most pressing gap concerns the availability of data, and the design of rigorous, 
systematic and robust research to meaningfully explore this relationship. There is a pressing 
need for robust research that, for example, pairs and effectively compares groups of 
un/under-employed young people, disaggregated by various factors (including patterns of 
25 
 
social difference, but also by forms of violence, and degrees of participation), in violence and 
conflict, in addition to young people who do not participate. Currently, much existing 
research selects on the dependent variable through research on participants in violence 
alone, or on ‘high-risk’ populations who are seen as ‘vulnerable’ to violence or radicalisation 
(Izzi 2013). Alternatively, research a parallel body of research typically extrapolates from 
general conditions – such as the level of youth unemployment in an economy – to say little 
about individual motivations. Randomised control trials provide one opportunity to explore 
this more robustly, but so too would the phased roll-out of programmes, or natural 
experiments involving differentiated work or employment prospects, or differentiated violence 
dynamics, across territory or time. More precise research methods are particularly important 
because of the fallacy of linking wider conditions to individual action in cases where violence 
is, typically, a minority activity.  
 
A second gap in the research concerns the disaggregation of ‘youth’ as a presumed 
homogenous category of people, and of experience. To date, insufficient attention has been 
paid to the diversity of ‘youth’ as a category in this research, and the field has often failed to 
ask: how does work shape participation in violence among and across different categories of 
youth (age, gender, urban/rural, and other signifiers of social difference)? This is particularly 
crucial if we follow the proposition that the role and value of work, and the nature and 
contours of youth, are socially constructed. In that case, we should expect this relationship to 
vary within and across individuals and groups of young people. However, little evidence has 
been presented on this variation so far. 
 
A third opportunity for future research concerns the disaggregation of violence itself, in a bid 
to better understand the varied relationships between work and violence, and types of 
violence with each other. For example, how does low-intensity violence escalate to high-
intensity, and vice versa; how do young individuals radicalise in and out of violent groups; 
and what, if any, role does work play in these dynamics? Critically, situating this relationship 
within a wider appreciation of the political conditions, motivations and incentives for 
participation in violence – including self-defence, self-preservation, protection, and violence 
at different temporal and geographic points in a conflict – would contribute to advancing this 
literature, and better integrating recent progress in conflict and violence research. 
 
Finally, too little is known about the nature and types of work, and how these relate to 
violence, including whether they facilitate, motivate, or preclude it. Evidence suggests that 
legal work and participation in violence are not mutually exclusive in all contexts, and so we 
require a better understanding of how work can co-exist with violence, and even produce it. 
This might include attention to the nature of work, and the ways in which particular types of 
work may produce different economic, or social incentives, or fail to meet particular social 
expectations on the part of an individual. Research in this area might also turn to more 
practical, or logistical, considerations around how certain forms of work (for example, highly 
seasonal work, or work in urban or rural locations) can co-exist in young people’s lives with 
participation in different forms of violence. Similarly, if violence is caused by multiple factors, 
one of which may be work, then what kind of conditions would need to shift alongside 
employment provision/job creation, to be most effective, and what opportunities does this 
present for interventions and policy? Evidence suggests that, particularly in low-income 
countries, households diversify their income streams across multiple forms of economic 
activity: in that case, how do variations in the nature of this portfolio (including its reliability, 
variability and composition) affect the likelihood of participating in violence, or supplementing 
some activity with violence? 
  
26 
 
References 
Aaltonen, M.; Macdonald, J.; Martikainen, P. and Kivivuori, J. (2013) ‘Examining the 
Generality of the Unemployment-Crime Association’, Criminology 51.3: 561–94 
 
Azeng, T.F. and Yogo, T.U. (2015) Youth Unemployment, Education and Political Instability: 
Evidence from Selected Developing Countries 1991–2009, Households in Conflict 
Network Working Paper 200, www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
06/HiCN-WP-200.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Azeng, T.F. and Yogo, T.U. (2013) Youth Unemployment and Political Instability in Selected 
Developing Countries, African Development Bank Group Working Paper Series 171, 
www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_171_-
_Youth_Unemployment_and_Political_Instability_in_Selected_Developing_Countries.p
df (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Barker, G. and Ricardo, C. (2005) Young Men and the Construction of Masculinity in sub-
Saharan Africa: Implications for HIV/AIDS, Conflict, and Violence, Social Development 
Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Series, Paper 26, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/481401468101357773/pdf/327120rev0PA
PER0AFR0young0men0WP26.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Berman, E.; Callen, M.; Felter, J.H. and Shapiro, J.N. (2011) ‘Do Working Men Rebel? 
Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 55.4: 496–528 
 
Blattman, C. and Annan, J. (2016) ‘Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A 
Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State’, American Political Science 
Review 110.1: 1–17 
 
Blattman, C. and Ralston, L. (2015) Generating Employment in Poor and Fragile States: 
Evidence from Labor Market and Entrepreneurship Programs, SSRN Working Paper, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2622220 (accessed                
15 February 2017) 
 
Botha, A. (2014) ‘Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization among Individuals who 
Joined al-Shabaab in Kenya’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37.11: 895–919 
 
Bracewell, W. (2000) ‘Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian Nationalism’, Nations and 
Nationalism 6.4: 563–90 
 
Brett, R. and Specth, I. (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight, Boulder CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
 
Bricker, N.Q. and Foley, M.C. (2013) ‘The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The 
Importance of the Labor Market’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7.1: 
179–94 
 
Caruso, R. and Gavrilova, E. (2012) ‘Youth Unemployment, Terrorism and Political Violence: 
Evidence from the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and 
Public Policy 18.2, https://doi.org/10.1515/1554–8597.1254 
 
Cederman, L.-E. and Gleditsch, K.S. (2009) ‘Introduction to Special Issue on 
“Disaggregating Civil War”’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53.40: 487–95 
27 
 
 
Ciarli, T.; Kofol, C. and Menon, C. (2015) Business as Unusual. An Explanation of the 
Increase of Private Activity in High-Conflict Areas in Afghanistan, Private Enterprise 
Development in Low-Income Countries Working Paper, http://pedl.cepr.org/sites/ 
default/files/Ciarli per cent20et per cent20al per cent20Afghanistan per cent20Working 
per cent20Paper.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Colino, A. (2012) ‘Conflict Resolution Processes, Uncertainty and Labour Demand: The 
Case of The Basque Country’, Journal of Peace Research 49.5: 661–70 
 
Cramer, C. (2010) Unemployment and Participation in Violence, World Development Report 
2011 Background Paper, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/ 
10986/9247/WDR2011_0022.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Dhillon, N. and Yousef, T.M. (2009) Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young 
People in the Middle East, Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press 
 
Dietrich, C. and Quain, C. (2014) Gender in Conflict, ISS Europa Brief Issue Paper 33, 
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_33_Gender_in_conflict.pdf (accessed          
15 February 2017) 
 
Dolan, C. (2000) What Do You Remember? A Rough Guide to the War in Northern Uganda 
1986–2000, Accord COPE Working Paper 33, London: Accord 
 
Ebiede, T.M. (2017) ‘Employing Ex-Combatants in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries’, 
GREAT Insights 6.1: 11–13 
 
The Economist (2011) ‘Young, Jobless and Looking for Trouble’, www.economist.com/blogs/ 
schumpeter/2011/02/youth_unemployment (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Fetzer, T. (2014) ‘Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India’, 
unpublished manuscript, http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp53.pdf (accessed        
15 February 2017) 
 
Frederiksen, B.F. and Munive, J. (2010) ‘Young Men and Women in Africa: Conflicts, 
Enterprise and Aspiration’, Young 18.3: 249–58 
 
Gough, K.; Langevang, T. and Owusu, G. (2013) ‘Youth Employment in a Globalising World’, 
International Development Planning Review 35.2: 91–102 
 
Groes-Green, C. (2009) ‘Hegemonic and Subordinated Masculinities: Class, Violence and 
Sexual Performance among Young Mozambican Men’, Nordic Journal of African 
Studies 18.4: 286–304 
 
Hart, D.; Atkins, R. and Youniss, J. (2005) ‘Knowledge, Youth Bulges, and Rebellion’, 
Psychological Science 16.8: 661–62 
 
Hegre, H.; Østby, G. and Raleigh, C. (2009) ‘Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated 
Study of Liberia’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53.4: 598–623 
 
Hoffman, D. (2011) ‘Violence, Just in Time: War and Work in Contemporary West Africa’, 
Cultural Anthropology 26.1: 34–57 
 
Hoffmann, K. (2010) ‘The Ethics of Child-Soldiering in the Congo’, Young 18.3: 339–58 
 
28 
 
Holmes, R.; McCord, A. and Hagen-Zanker, J. with Bergh, G. and Zanker, F. (2013) What Is 
the Evidence on the Impact of Employment Creation on Stability and Poverty 
Reduction in Fragile States: A Systematic Review, Overseas Development Institute, 
May 2013, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/8386.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Hudson, R.A. (1999) The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist 
and Why?, a report prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J.M. (2008) ‘Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation 
in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science 52.2: 436–55 
 
Izzi, V. (2013) ‘Just Keeping them Busy? Youth Employment Projects as a Peacebuilding 
Tool’, International Development Planning Review 35.2: 103–17 
 
Kaplan, R.D. (1994) ‘The Coming Anarchy’, The Atlantic, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/ (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Khalil, J. (2014) ‘Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions are Not Synonymous: How to Place the 
Key Disjuncture between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of our Research into 
Political Violence’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37.2: 198–211 
 
Krishnan, S.; Rocca, C.H.; Hubbard, A.E.; Subbiah, K.; Edmeades, J. and Padian, N.S. 
(2010) ‘Do Changes in Spousal Employment Status Lead to Domestic Violence? 
Insights from a Prospective Study in Bangalore, India’, Social Science & Medicine 
70.1: 136–43 
 
Krueger, A.B. (2008) What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
Krueger, A.B. and Malecková, J. (2003) ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal 
Connection?’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17.4: 119–44 
 
Kurtenbach, S. (2014) ‘Postwar Violence in Guatemala: A Mirror of the Relationship between 
Youth and Adult Society’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 8.1: 119–33 
 
Maclay, C. and Skelton, J. (2017) ‘Complex Paths: Supporting Mixed Livelihoods in Fragile 
States’, GREAT Insights 6.1: 4–6  
 
Massing, M. (2007) ‘Iraq: The Hidden Human Cost’, The New York Review of Books, 
www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/12/20/iraq-the-hidden-human-costs/ (accessed        
15 February 2017) 
 
Mercy Corps (2015) Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence, 
www.mercycorps.org.uk/research-resources/youth-consequences-unemployment-
injustice-and-violence (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Miguel, E. (2007) ‘Poverty and Violence: An Overview of Recent Research and Implications 
for Foreign Aid’, in L. Brainard and D. Chollet (eds), Too Poor for Peace? Global 
Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century, Washington DC: Brookings Institute 
Press 
 
29 
 
Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) (2015) ‘Policy Brief: Understanding 
the Complex Causes and Processes of Radicalisation’, www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/PB-1-Causes-and-Processes.pdf (accessed 15 February 
2017) 
 
Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth (2015) ‘UN Security Council Adopts 
Historic Resolution on Youth, Peace and Security’, 9 December, 
www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/12/un-security-council-adopts-historic-resolution-on-
youth-peace-and-security/ (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Oosterom, M. with Kache, C.; Mususa, D. and Pswarayi, L. (2016) The Violent Politics of 
Informal Work, and How Young People Navigate Them: A Conceptual Framework, IDS 
Evidence Report 198, www.ids.ac.uk/publication/the-violent-politics-of-informal-work-
and-how-young-people-navigate-them-a-conceptual-framework (accessed 15 February 
2017) 
 
Ortiz, I. and Cummins, M. (2012) When the Global Crisis and Youth Bulge Collide: Double 
the Jobs Trouble for Youth, UNICEF Social and Economic Policy Working Paper, 
www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Global_Crisis_and_Youth_Bulge_-_FINAL.pdf 
(accessed 15 February 2017)  
 
Parkinson, S.E. (2013) ‘Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social 
Networks in War’, American Political Science Review 107.3: 418–32 
 
Patinkin, J. (2014) ‘Young Men and Guns: Why South Sudan’s War Flamed so Fast and 
Brightly’, The Christian Science Monitor, 
www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/0319/Young-men-and-guns-Why-South-
Sudan-s-war-flamed-so-fast-and-brightly-video (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Piazza, J.A. (2011) ‘Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism’, 
Journal of Peace Research 48.3: 339–53 
 
Piazza, J.A. (2006) ‘Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages’, Terrorism and Political Violence 18.1: 159–77 
 
Saferworld (2014) Masculinities, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Men through a 
Gender Lens, www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/862-masculinities-
conflict-and-peacebuilding-perspectives-on-men-through-a-gender-lens (accessed    
15 February 2017) 
 
Sirleaf, E.J. (2006) ‘Speech Delivered by Her Excellency Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of 
the Republic of Liberia at the 95th International Labour Conference’, 
www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/ilo_speech.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Solow, R.M. (1990) The Labor Market as a Social Institution, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Stewart, F. (2010) ‘Women in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’, paper to be presented at 
the Economic and Social Council’s 2010 Thematic Discussion of ‘The Role of Women 
in Countries in Special Situations: Africa, LDSCs, LLDCs, SIDS, Post-conflict and 
Post-crisis Countries’, 30 June 2010, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/julyhls/pdf10/ 
frances_stewart.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) (2005) ‘Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in 
West Africa’, http://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/youth-unemployment-and-regional-
insecurity-west-africa (accessed 15 February 2017) 
30 
 
 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2015) ‘Security Council, Unanimously Adopting 
Resolution 2250 (2015), Urges Member States to Increase Representation of Youth in 
Decision-Making at All Levels’, 9 December, 
www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Urdal, H. (2012) A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence, United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, Expert Paper 
2012/1, www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert per 
cent20Paper.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Urdal, H. (2006) ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’, International 
Studies Quarterly 50.3: 607–29 
 
Utas, M. (2003) ‘Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War’, Dissertation in 
Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala University, https://uu.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:163000/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Verwimp, P. (2015) Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq and the Socio-Economic Environment 
they Faced at Home: A Comparison of European Countries, Households in Conflict 
Network Working Paper Series 201, www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-2018.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Viterna, J.S. (2006) ‘Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women’s Mobilization into 
the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army’, American Journal of Sociology 112.1: 1–45 
 
Walton, O. (2010) Youth, Armed Violence and Job Creation Programmes: A Rapid Mapping 
Study, Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre Report, www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/eirs11.pdf 
(accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
Weinstein, J.M. (2006) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
White House (2014) ‘Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations 
General Assembly, 24 September 2014’, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-
assembly (accessed 15 February 2017) 
 
World Bank (2014) Liberia: Can Employment Opportunities Help Build Peace?, From 
Evidence to Policy Series, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHDOFFICE/ 
Resources/Liberia_E2P_Read.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017) 
